PyPI / requests-toolbelt / 1.0.0
requests-toolbelt 1.0.0
- Source
- https://github.com/requests/toolbelt
- Tag scanned
1.0.0- Compared with
0.10.1(0 signals introduced since)- Files
- 83 scanned, 19 skipped (binary, oversized, or unrecognised)
- Signals
- 0 critical · 0 warn · 3 info
- Scan time
- 3.3 s
- LLM review
- Reviewed by claude-haiku-5-5 (Anthropic): 3 of 3 warn and critical signals; 3 demoted to info.
- Disclude version
- 4.1.0
- Scanned (UTC)
- 2026-10-22 03:45
Signals
Ordered by severity, then signals introduced in this release. Hidden characters are shown as ⟨U+…⟩.
-
: , : , : ,likely benign Example script opens its own source file to attach it as a form upload in a progress-bar demo.Reasoning
This is an example script in a requests-toolkit style monitor demo that opens its own file as a multipart upload payload. Reading __file__ to upload the script itself is a demo convenience, not payload extraction; there is no decoding or execution of the bytes.
-
: , : , })likely benign Second form field in the same demo uploads the script's own source file.Reasoning
Same pattern as the adjacent finding: the second multipart field re-opens the script's own source for upload. The file bytes are sent as form data, not executed or used to recover hidden content.
-
likely benign Packaging helper that runs a fixed build-and-upload shell command when invoked with submit or publish.
Reasoning
A standard setup.py publish helper that runs a fixed literal command, gated on the sys.argv value 'submit' or 'publish'. No attacker-controlled input or encoded payload is involved; this is a common maintainer convenience pattern.
Reproduce This Scan
Run disclude locally to verify. Add --format sarif for SARIF output. Add --llm (with an API key in the environment) to include the LLM review.
&&