boto3 1.43.115

Source: https://github.com/boto/boto3
Tag scanned: 1.43.115
Compared with: 1.43.114 (0 signals introduced since)
Files: 202 scanned, 37 skipped (binary, oversized, or unrecognised)
Signals: 0 critical · 0 warn · 1 info
Scan time: 4.2 s
LLM review: Reviewed by claude-haiku-5-5 (Anthropic): 1 of 1 warn and critical signal; 1 demoted to info.
Disclude version: 4.0.0
Scanned (UTC): 2026-10-20 00:41

Signals

Ordered by severity, then signals introduced in this release. Hidden characters are shown as ⟨U+…⟩.

info ~~warn~~ → info by review dynamic-execution scripts/new-change:123:13

`subprocess.Popen` called with `shell=True` and a literal command (ast pass, confidence 0.70)
```
        editor = env.get('VISUAL', env.get('EDITOR', 'vim'))
        p = subprocess.Popen(f'{editor} {f.name}', shell=True)
        p.communicate()
        with open(f.name) as f:
```
likely benign LLM, confidence 0.85 Launches the user's configured editor on a temp file via subprocess.Popen with shell=True.
Reasoning
The command is built from the user's VISUAL or EDITOR environment variable plus a temporary file name, then run with shell=True. This is a common way to launch an editor from a helper script. The finding's message says 'literal command', but the command is interpolated from the environment, so it is not literal. The risk is shell-word splitting or injection through a user-controlled variable, which is a local-user concern rather than evidence of malicious intent or obfuscation. The file name comes from a tempfile the script creates. Nothing in the snippet suggests a dropper or hidden behaviour.

Reproduce This Scan

Run disclude locally to verify. Add --format sarif for SARIF output. Add --llm (with an API key in the environment) to include the LLM review.

cargo install disclude --version 4.0.0
git clone https://github.com/boto/boto3 boto3 && cd boto3
git checkout 1.43.115
disclude scan --severity info --diff 1.43.114 .