boto3 1.43.112

Source: https://github.com/boto/boto3
Tag scanned: 1.43.112
Compared with: 1.43.111 (0 signals introduced since)
Files: 202 scanned, 37 skipped (binary, oversized, or unrecognised)
Signals: 0 critical · 0 warn · 1 info
Scan time: 3.3 s
LLM review: Reviewed by claude-haiku-5-5 (Anthropic): 1 of 1 warn and critical signal; 1 demoted to info.
Disclude version: 4.0.0
Scanned (UTC): 2026-10-14 18:08

Signals

Ordered by severity, then signals introduced in this release. Hidden characters are shown as ⟨U+…⟩.

info ~~warn~~ → info by review dynamic-execution scripts/new-change:123:13

`subprocess.Popen` called with `shell=True` and a literal command (ast pass, confidence 0.70)
```
        editor = env.get('VISUAL', env.get('EDITOR', 'vim'))
        p = subprocess.Popen(f'{editor} {f.name}', shell=True)
        p.communicate()
        with open(f.name) as f:
```
likely benign LLM, confidence 0.85 Launches the user's preferred editor on a temporary file via a shell command built from the VISUAL/EDITOR environment variable.
Reasoning
The shell=True call interpolates the user's EDITOR/VISUAL environment variable and a temp file name into a command. This is a common, legitimate pattern for launching an editor (editors often need arguments like 'code --wait'). The risk is shell injection only from the local user's own environment, not from attacker-controlled input, and nothing indicates obfuscation or malicious intent. It is a code-quality concern rather than an attack.

Reproduce This Scan

Run disclude locally to verify. Add --format sarif for SARIF output. Add --llm (with an API key in the environment) to include the LLM review.

cargo install disclude --version 4.0.0
git clone https://github.com/boto/boto3 boto3 && cd boto3
git checkout 1.43.112
disclude scan --severity info --diff 1.43.111 .