zerocopy 0.8.63
- Source
- https://github.com/google/zerocopy
- Artifact scanned
zerocopy-0.8.63.crate- Compared with
zerocopy-0.8.62.crate(0 signals introduced since)- Files
- 155 scanned, 254 skipped (binary, oversized, or unrecognised)
- Signals
- 0 critical · 0 warn · 2 info
- Scan time
- 3.0 s
- LLM review
- Reviewed by claude-haiku-5-5 (Anthropic): 1 of 1 warn and critical signal; 1 demoted to info.
- Disclude version
- 4.3.0
- Scanned (UTC)
- 2026-10-24 04:12
Signals
Ordered by severity, then signals introduced in this release. Hidden characters are shown as ⟨U+…⟩.
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likely benign A bash wrapper script that execs a locally built cargo-zerocopy helper binary from the repository's tools directory, passing through its arguments.
Reasoning
The script changes into a directory and then execs a binary built from the repository's own tools directory (tools/target/debug/cargo-zerocopy), forwarding arguments. This is a typical cargo wrapper pattern in the zerocopy project, where the tool is built locally before being executed. The dynamic path is a variable rooted in the repo, not a downloaded or attacker-controlled location. Residual doubt: the binary's origin is not shown in the snippet, but nothing here indicates malicious intent.
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new.to_string, "The conversion failed because the source bytes are not a valid value of the destination type.\n\ \n\ Destination type: bool"
Reproduce This Scan
Run disclude locally to verify. These commands scan the published file; the "new in this release" marks come from comparing it with the previous release's file, which they don't repeat. Add --format sarif for SARIF output. Add --llm (with an API key in the environment) to include the LLM review.
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