crates.io / untrusted / 0.9.0

untrusted 0.9.0

Source

https://github.com/briansmith/untrusted

Commit scanned

89c8b8415f69 (recorded by crates.io)

Compared with

9f51f604df5a (0 signals introduced since)

Files

10 scanned, 4 skipped (binary, oversized, or unrecognised)

Signals

0 critical · 0 warn · 3 info

Scan time

2.1 s

LLM review

Reviewed by claude-haiku-5-5 (Anthropic): 1 of 1 warn and critical signal; 1 demoted to info.

Disclude version

4.0.0

Scanned (UTC)

2026-10-14 21:16

Signals

Ordered by severity, then signals introduced in this release. Hidden characters are shown as ⟨U+…⟩.

1. info dynamic-execution mk/cargo.sh:145:5

   command name is a variable (`$llvm_version`) that this file sets only to plain text (ast pass, confidence 0.40)

       basename=$(basename "$executable")
       llvm-profdata-$llvm_version merge -sparse ""$coverage_dir"/$basename.profraw" -o "$coverage_dir"/$basename.profdata
       mkdir -p "$coverage_dir"/reports
       llvm-cov-$llvm_version export \

2. info dynamic-execution mk/cargo.sh:147:5

   command name is a variable (`$llvm_version`) that this file sets only to plain text (ast pass, confidence 0.40)

       mkdir -p "$coverage_dir"/reports
       llvm-cov-$llvm_version export \
         --instr-profile "$coverage_dir"/$basename.profdata \
         --format lcov \

3. info warn → info by review dynamic-execution mk/runner:21:1

   command name is a variable (`$*`) not set in this file — the caller or environment decides what runs (ast pass, confidence 0.70)

   
   $*

   likely benign LLM, confidence 0.80 A bash script whose final line executes its positional arguments as a command, a pass-through runner.

   Reasoning

   The snippet is a bare `$*` expanding all positional arguments as a command name. This is a generic pass-through runner pattern (like a wrapper that executes its arguments, common in make-style helper scripts). It is dynamic execution that could be abused if arguments were attacker-controlled, but within a local build runner the arguments come from the invoking developer or Makefile. Without evidence of fetching remote content or hiding the command, it reads as a legitimate wrapper rather than an obfuscated dropper.

Reproduce This Scan

Run disclude locally to verify. Add --format sarif for SARIF output. Add --llm (with an API key in the environment) to include the LLM review.

cargo install disclude --version 4.0.0
git clone https://github.com/briansmith/untrusted untrusted && cd untrusted
git checkout 89c8b8415f692d3803d183fc5fbf9ec08a6adcf4
disclude scan --severity info --diff 9f51f604df5a516407014d13f6a037a22fbedac3 .